INTRODUCTION
Indviduals who complete law school typically receive a large boost to their earnings compared to what they would likely have earned with a terminal bachelor's degree. The law earnings premium has exceeded the cost of law school by a wide margin, even toward the bottom of the earnings distribution. 1 However, questions remain about whether the lifetime value of the law degree will be different for those graduating into weak economies or with unusually large or small cohorts of fellow law graduates. In particular, do deteriorating employment outcomes shortly after graduation for recent law school graduates entering the labor market during a recession predict a smaller boost to earnings for those now starting law school? Do smaller law school class sizes predict a larger boost to earnings? What can we learn about the predictive power of different proposed leading and lagging indicators from long-term historical patterns?
This article investigates cohort effects in the law degree earnings premium; in other words, whether students who graduate in recessions or booms, or with an usually large or small cohort of law school graduates, see lasting effects from this on their lifetime earnings relative to what they could expect to earn with just a bachelor's degree. We also consider the extent to which cohort effects are predictable three to four years in advance when prospective law students must decide whether or not to enroll, and what reliable predictors, if any, are available to help guide student decision making about timing legal education. We simulate a variety of law school timing strategies to test whether they perform better than immediate law school attendance. We find that immediate attendance consistently outperforms any waiting strategy.
The labor economics literature provides at least some support for cohort effects among college educated workers, both with respect to macroeconomic conditions at labor force entry and with respect to cohort size. The support for cohort effects driven by macroeconomic conditions is stronger. Several studies suggest that entering the labor market during periods of high unemployment can depress early earnings, while entering a booming economy can contribute to higher earnings.
2 However, many studies ECON. 695 (2004) . Kahn found negative effects on wages for college educated U.S. white males graduating into a recession of between 1 and 20 percent per year, but the effect faded as workers gained experience. Lisa B. Kahn, The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy, 17 LAB. ECON. 303 (2010) . Oreopoulos also found negative effects on earnings for college-educated Canadian workers entering the work force during high-unemployment periods; these also faded within five to ten years of work report that these effects fade as workers gain experience. 3 While lingering effects of unemployment at graduation have been observed for both high school graduates and college graduates, 4 the long-term impact of graduating into a recession appears to be dampened for those with higher levels of education.
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The evidence for cohort size is mixed, with some studies suggesting that larger cohorts are associated with lower earnings, 6 and others finding the opposite or no result. 7 Recently, legal scholars such as Deborah Merritt and Theodore Seto have hypothesized that the size of law school cohorts, relative to U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projections of job openings for lawyers or relative to population, may predict employment outcomes for law students shortly after graduation. 8 Although BLS and other labor economists have cautioned against using occupational employment projections to guide educational investment, 9 such studies have not focused specifically on legal education.
In a profession such as law where high income jobs are available along a specific career path, it is important to understand how early random job market fluctuations affect long-term earnings, especially start their careers in finance and are therefore more likely to have higher earnings throughout their careers compared to those who graduate into weaker economies. 63-73 (2015) . 6 Freeman found large changes in law school enrollment in response to fluctuations in earnings of young lawyers, and that law cohort size in turn has a negative association with law graduate earnings. Richard B. Freeman, Legal "Cobwebs": A Recursive Model of the Market for New Lawyers, 57 REV. ECON. & STAT. 171 (1975) . Welch found that a large entry cohort depresses wages in a way that persists, at least somewhat, over the entire career. Finis Welch, Effects of cohort size on earnings: The baby boom babies' financial bust, 87 J. POL. ECON. S65 (1979) . Berger found negative effects of graduating with large cohorts of college students majoring in the same field, with larger effects for liberal arts and humanities majors and smaller negative effects for engineering and business majors. Mark C Berger, Cohort size effects on earnings: Differences by college major, 7 ECON. EDUC. REV. 375 (1988) . 7 Falaris and Peters report an association between larger cohorts and higher earnings, possibly mediated by investment in education. Evangelos M. Falaris & H. Elizabeth Peters, Schooling Choices and Demographic Cycles, 27 J. HUM. RESOURCES 551 (1992) . Connelly and Gottschalk also found evidence that cohort size behaviorally affected the decision to attend college. Rachel Connelly & Peter Gottschalk, The effect of cohort composition on human capital accumulation across generations, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 155 (1995) . 8 Professor Merritt writes: "The Bureau's occupational employment projections . . . answer the very question that many law school applicants want to know: How many new lawyers will the economy be able to absorb this decade? . . . [T] he economy can absorb about [one tenth of the 10-year BLS projected job openings for] new lawyers per year, while law schools are producing well over double that number. . . . At best, the Bureau estimates . . .less than one job for every two graduates of an ABA-accredited law school." Deborah Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, the Money Gap, and the Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL 'Y 1, 3-6 (2013) . Professor Seto, discussing newer, higher BLS job openings projections under a revised methodology writes, "If the new BLS projections are accurate, we should see demand and supply in relative equilibrium in 2015 and a significant excess of demand over supply beginning in 2016." Theodore P. Seto, THE PROPOSED NEW BLS LAWYER REPLACEMENT PROJECTIONS, TAXPROF BLOG (2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/11/seto-new-bls-data.html (last visited Jan 23, 2015) . 9 Michael W. Horrigan, Employment projections to 2012: Concepts and context, 127 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 15-16 (2004) for those at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution. Simkovic and McIntyre find fluctuations in earnings premiums from year to year, but did not investigate cohort effects tied to year of graduation. 10 In this study, we include data from the 1980s to the present from the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP). The sample includes earnings data from 1984 to 2013 and individuals who graduated law school from the 1960s through 2008. We use the year of graduation for all the law graduates in our sample to estimate the effects across decades of recessions or cohort size on later outcomes. 11 It should be noted that whereas much of the previous literature has focused on raw earnings differences, we consider differences in law earnings premiums. This is because unemployment at labor market entry also affects those with lower levels of education, and because the incremental increase in earnings attributable to a law degree is a measure of the value of the law degree.
Using these cohort effects, we then simulate the likely effect of a recession such as the 2008 downturn on the lifetime earnings premiums of law degree holders who graduated into a recession. This addresses questions about the importance of recent short-term indicators to subsequent long-term outcomes, and whether it is advisable for prospective law students to attempt to "time the market." It also contributes to the longstanding economic literature about the importance of early job market outcomes for determining one's lifetime earnings.
I. ESTIMATING COHORT EFFECTS WITH LONGITUDINAL DATA FROM SIPP

A. Data and specification
We estimate the earnings premium associated with a law degree by using earnings, education, and demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is composed of several overlapping "panels" of respondents, each followed for several years. The earliest data are from 1984 with the latest data coming from the end of 2013.
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Individuals report monthly earnings three times per year, which we aggregate into yearly earnings.
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Our sample contains earnings data from 1984 to 2013 for individuals age 23 to 65 with either a bachelor's or law degree. 14 We include in our sample those who report being disabled or unemployed but looking 10 Id. 11 The methodological challenge is separating age (or experience) effects from cohort effects. Following the labor economics literature, we assume that age effects are smoothly continuous, while cohort effects are tied to macroeconomic shocks such as recessions.
12 Because educational attainment is measured at the start of each panel, the most recent law degree holders in the sample will have graduated in 2008. 13 We use longitudinal income imputations that simply fill in missing months based on prior and future months' earnings but we do not use any "hard" cross-sectional imputation that attempted to estimate income using the earnings of other people.
14 We use age 23 to 25 earnings of bachelor's degree holders who resemble law degree holders to estimate opportunity holders also tend to be slightly older (41 years on average) than the bachelor's degree holders (38 years).
As a starting point, consider the following empirical specification:
Where ! !" is log annual earnings for worker ! in year !. !"! ! is a dummy variable for receipt of a law degree. The !"! ! dummy is not indexed by time since educational data for each panel are only recorded once per person near the beginning of the survey. Our sample includes only those with either a bachelor's degree or a law degree, thus our comparison is the difference between a law degree and a terminal bachelor's degree. Our main coefficients of interest, !, are the law school premium as a function of starting cohort conditions, captured by the variables ! ! , which we will discuss more below.
! !" captures controls for a quadratic in work experience (proxied by years since graduation), gender, race, ethnicity, public vs. private high school graduation, time to complete a bachelor's degree, as well as
costs of foregone earnings while in law school for purposes of calculating the present value of the law degree. We required law degree holders to report earning a professional school degree in the field of law and excluded a small number of individuals reporting a master's or doctorate degree. We also dropped all those imputed to be law degree holders. 15 In unreported analysis using only data from the 1990s and 2000s, we considered additional controls for college major, years to college completion interacted with college major, and indicators for completing two or more years of advanced high school math, science, foreign languages, or English, public or private high school, and college prep high school. The addition of these variables did not significantly change the results of our analysis. 16 Time to BA may reflect earnings ability, since all else being equal, more academically capable students, or those with access to more family resources, are likely to complete their degrees in fewer years. However, college majors associated with higher earnings (such as engineering majors) tend to take longer to complete, and we do not include controls for college major in our main specification.
The parameters of interest are the law school premium, !, which vary with cohort starting conditions. In a simple specification this would simply be a single number capturing the log difference in earnings for those with a law degree. Here it is a vector because we will allow it to vary according to conditions, ! ! , at the time of graduation. ! ! is initially composed of a constant plus unemployment and J.D. graduating cohort size growth. 17 We measure unemployment for prime-age males (age 25-54) because their labor supply is relatively inelastic. 18, 19 We also control for unemployment at the time, !, of the survey. This helps distinguish between the effects of initial unemployment at labor market entry and subsequent economic conditions.
Cohort size is the year over year percent increase or decrease in the number of J.D. or LL.B. degrees awarded per year according to the American Bar Association (ABA). 20,21 Prime-age male unemployment is normalized so that 0 represents a sample typical prime-age-male unemployment rate of about 5. Cohort size is normalized so that 0 represents no cohort growth. Thus the law premium we report for the baseline "normal" case is a graduation year where the unemployment rate for prime-age males is 5 and the graduating cohort is the same size as the last year. Although cohorts do grow on average, we chose the zero growth base case for simplicity in interpretation.
Unemployment and cohort size along with a constant term, form ! ! and are interacted with law school graduation. These variables are all also included in ! !" and so appear as uninteracted controls.
We supplement SIPP data with the U. See discussion in the data appendix. 18 We do not use law-specific employment because of sharp data limitations. NALP data on law graduate employment 9 months after graduation is only available starting in 1985, whereas our sample includes individuals graduating decades earlier.
Additional years of data provide valuable macroeconomic variation in conditions at graduation. The Current Population Survey (CPS) has data back to 1968 on unemployment of those currently or recently reporting their occupation as 'lawyer' (i.e., a subset of law graduates). However, due to the small sample size of unemployed lawyers in any given year, standard errors are too large to accurately estimate year-specific, law-specific unemployment rates. We cannot use non-medical professional degree holders (a broader proxy for law graduates that we use for recent graduates in Part III.C. ) with CPS data before 1992 because CPS previously measured educational attainment in terms of years of college completed rather than in terms of specific degrees obtained. Prime-age-male unemployment and NALP employment are reasonably well correlated (r = -0.52). 19 We also consider a dummy variable specification, discussed later, that divides years into high, medium and low unemployment and cohort growth. 20 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ENROLLMENT AND  DEGREES  AWARDED 1963-2012 (2013) , http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment _degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan 1, 2015) . 21 Variation in this measure should primarily reflect year to year variations and be less driven by long-term trends than alternate measures of cohort size, such as number of law degrees awarded scaled by various population measures (total, working age, or college-educated population).
7 III.C. below.
Past research suggests that cohort effects vary with experience level. As such, we perform our regression first on the overall sample and then on several subsamples divided by work experience, including 1 to 4 years, 5 to 8, and 9 or more years of experience. All estimates are weighted with SIPP sample weights. Observations are by person-year and are clustered by person. Table 2 reports our base specification. In Column (1), we report the log earnings gap between the general population of bachelor's degree holders and law recipients by unemployment level at graduation, cohort size, time to BA, and time between college and law school. Columns (2) through (4) give estimates based on three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsamples of the data based on their years of experience, nine or more years, five to eight, and one to four. Column (1) reports that for the entire sample, the log premium is 0.55 (or 73%) for those entering the market with neither abnormally high or low cohort conditions. The next two rows of Column (1) find that the premium is not affected by the unemployment rate or cohort size at graduation. For example, increasing the unemployment rate by one percentage point (such as from 4 to 5) lowers earnings by about 0.3% on average. Additionally, the standard error of 1.3% means the effect could just as easily be positive as negative. For cohort growth, we find a coefficient of exactly zero, with a standard error of 0.2%. Thus one cannot reject the hypothesis that no effect exists, and one can be fairly confident that any effect is quite small.
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B. Base specification
These initial results suggest that, for example, graduating in a bad job market has no long-term effects on law graduates' earnings relative to similar bachelor's degree holders. 23 As noted above, we focus on interactions between the law earnings premium and initial unemployment; by contrast, much of the previous literature considers the effect of initial unemployment on raw earnings.
Column (2) reinforces this view. Here we consider only mature law graduates who graduated law school 9 or more years ago. The point estimate for the typical premium is basically the same at 0.55 (73%). The interaction effects are tightly clustered around 0 with tight standard errors, so that one can still rule out large effects with some certainty. Thus whatever impact a recession or bad fortune may have on a cohort in their early years, the aggregate effect on this cohort of law graduates appears to dissipate 22 In an unreported regression, rather than cluster earnings-years by person, we averaged earnings across years for each person into a single observation and assumed experience was the midpoint experience level for that individual during the years of earnings observations. Results were substantially similar to those reported in Table 2 . 23 It should be noted that we measure cohort effects in terms of law graduate earnings relative to similar bachelor's degree holders, whereas the previous literature focused on raw dollar earnings of college graduates. To the extent that economic conditions at graduation have the same effect on college and law graduate earnings, this will not change the law earnings premium. Table 2 , Column (1) also finds no lifetime effects for bachelor's degree holders from conditions at graduation. within the decade.
Column (3) looks at law degree holders with five to eight years experience and once again finds no statistically significant effects, although the coefficient for initial unemployment has the expected negative sign.
While the most important results are those for the lifetime effects, the most dramatic ones are for the most junior law graduates, in Table 2 , Column (4). Unfortunately, our sample of freshly minted J.D.'s is smaller than our sample for older groups because our earnings data only extend back to 1984. Thus, the earliest an individual with 4 years of experience in our sample could have graduated is 1980, whereas those with many years of experience could have graduated decades earlier. Fortunately, the period of coverage includes substantial macroeconomic variation, including several large expansions and four economic downturns spaced about once per decade.
Though we find no evidence for cohort size effects, we do see a moderately large impact from unemployment, which lowers the premium by 4.6% per point of unemployment. A recession that caused a 3 point rise in unemployment would be expected to drop the law earnings premium by about 15 percent.
As we will discuss more below, earnings would fall even farther (another 7%) due to the economy-wide effect of the unemployment rate. Worse still, these effects would be compounded in the first year or possibly two by the covariate for the current unemployment rate. The estimates, though, come in two varieties. The economy-wide effects for unemployment at graduation and current unemployment effects are both estimated for bachelor's degree holders and law degree holders. These are fairly precise with standard errors of less than 1%. The interaction with law degree graduation is far less so with a standard error of 2.8% (p=0.12). Thus the effect on the premium is not statistically significant and could be quite a bit larger or smaller than our estimated coefficient. This result could be symmetric, so that recessions are damaging and boom times are invigorating, or it could be that only one of the two plays much of a role. In unreported results, we divided unemployment into high, medium and low bins. We found that the effect appears to come mostly from a boost during good years rather than a decline during recessions, though standard errors under this specification are far larger, and so it is difficult to make strong inferences.
Investigating the data, we find a boom time boost to law premiums driven by the very large premium law graduates earned during the late 90s boom, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 plots graduation cohort unemployment rates against the cohorts' law premium for those with 8 or fewer years of experience. Plotting just the 1-4 year cohorts by graduation year is quite noisy, but in this larger cut, one can see the tremendous returns in the boom of the late 90s and early 2000s. Graduates in those years saw law premium values of 80-95 log points. However, these benefits were short-lived. After the boom ended, earnings reverted to more normal levels. Table 2 shows that there is no statistically significant boost to earnings for those with five to eight years of experience. Figure 2 plots law premiums by experience and calendar year. In Figure 2 , one can see the boom in the late 90s, but otherwise the premium tends to be quite stable. However, we unfortunately do not have law graduates after 2008 in SIPP, so we lack data for the most recent downturn.
To better understand the impact of the recent downturn on inexperienced law graduates, we consider supplemental data from ACS. ACS has fields for level of education and type of advanced degree, such as professional degree or master's degree, but does not have field codes for advanced degrees, such as law or medicine. We therefore cannot identify law degree holders as readily in ACS as in SIPP, but can consider various proxy groups such as lawyers and professional degree holders excluding those working in medicine. This supplemental data is discussed in greater detail in Part III.C.
Turning from unemployment to cohort size, consistent with the literature, cohort size proves to be an unreliable predictor of earnings. The point estimate is small and statistically inseparable from zero. Thus we have no confidence that one can use cohort size alone to usefully predict earnings outcomes.
The poor empirical showing for cohort size as a predictor of earnings is not particularly surprising.
The relation between cohort size and earnings is theoretically ambiguous. An increase in cohort size could be associated with higher earnings premiums if: (1) prospective law students successfully anticipate labor market demand and time law school attendance accordingly; (2) law school admissions become more selective when the number of applicants increases and larger cohort size is therefore associated with higher underlying earnings ability of law graduates; 24 (3) law schools amortize fixed costs over a larger number of students during periods of increasing enrollment and use extra resources to increase the quality of legal education. On the other hand, an increase in cohort size could be associated with lower earnings premiums because (1) holding demand for labor and quality of labor constant, an increase in the quantity of labor supplied should reduce the market-clearing price and (2) to the extent capacity at law schools is unresponsive to revenue declines (at least in the short run), declining enrollments may be associated with additional resources per student and higher quality education. If countervailing effects occur simultaneously, the relation could be positive, negative, or there could be no discernable relationship.
The results suggest that among inexperienced workers, law earnings premiums are affected by unemployment at time of graduation. This effect may be concentrated among those who graduate during strong economies (periods of low unemployment) rather than downturns. This is in addition the impact downturns have on earnings throughout the economy, which we discuss below.
Consistent with prior studies, cohort effects fade quickly as workers gain experience and we find little support for lifetime persistence. In other words, law graduates who enter the workforce during strong or weak economies appear to converge on the annual earnings of those who graduate in moderate economies within 5 to 10 years. Nevertheless, lower earnings in earlier years may reduce the present value of lifetime earnings. We consider the extent to which this may affect the lifetime value of a law degree in
Part II below.
Each extra year to complete a bachelor's degree predicts approximately a 5 percent drop in the law premium. This is much larger than the 1.2 percent effect on those with terminal bachelor's degrees. The smaller effect of delayed college completion on earnings among bachelor's degree holders may reflect a greater concentration among terminal bachelor's degree holders of science and engineering majors, who generally earn well but take a long time to graduate. Each year of waiting between a bachelor's degree and a law degree predicts a 1.6 percent drop in the law premium. This could be due to either selection or causation.
The discussion above focuses on the effects that economic conditions at graduation and cohort size have on the law earnings premium-the difference between what law school graduates and similar bachelor's degree holders earn.
The effect on raw earnings is somewhat larger than the effect on law premiums because the effect on raw earnings will include effects of unemployment that impact college graduates. Table 2 , Column 4 reports that increasing unemployment at graduation by one point causes wages to fall by 2.3 log points, a statistically significant drop. Thus, even if there were no effect of unemployment at graduation on the law school premium, unemployment at graduation does affect graduates' earnings, by the same 2.3 percent it affects all the other workers in our sample. This result is consistent with the prior cohort effects literature and makes earnings even more pro-cyclical than premiums.
Of course, when making a decision about law school, it is the premium rather than the raw earnings that is most relevant. As discussed above, one of the reasons the law degree has appeared to lose value in recent years is because raw earnings have fallen for everyone, in addition to effects on the law earnings premium. Considering the remaining columns of Table 2 , we see little evidence of a strong ongoing effect from initial graduating conditions.
C. Fixed Effects specification
Our estimates in Table 2 could be biased if there are unobserved macroeconomic effects or secular trends that are poorly accounted for by the linear time trend, !, and the variables, ! ! and ! ! (cohort size, initial unemployment, and current unemployment). We address this possibility by including a full set of time dummy variables in Table 3 -one for each year of graduation, as well as another vector for each year from which we are collecting the earnings data 1983 to 2013. Compared to Table 2 , Table 3 estimates a more general specification:
! ! are a vector of dummies capturing the calendar year and ! ! are a comparable set that capture the year of entry into the job market, as proxied by the year the respondent graduated with their terminal degree. ! ! variables capture year-to-year effects of the economy on all workers, including both bachelor's and law graduates. ! ! capture entry effects, by which we mean how the residual effects of entering the job market still affect a worker over time. In combination, these two variables completely capture the current years of post graduation worker experience 25 for each person-year, which is the difference ! ! !.
These new controls allow for arbitrary, non-linear movements in calendar year effects, providing a general and flexible estimation approach. Current and graduation year dummy variables will capture unemployment and other macroeconomic conditions. This enables us to distinguish between the effects of unemployment at labor market entry when all cohorts initially search for work and the effects of subsequent unemployment rates, which also affect experienced workers.
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These estimates are reported in Table 3 . The results are similar to those in Table 2 . There are no statistically significant interaction effects for any group with more than four years of experience. Effects for the youngest group are the same as well, with the same unemployment effect that is only of borderline statistical significance (p=0.10). Cohort size remains a useless predictor of earnings outcomes.
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D. BLS projected job openings
In our analysis in Tables 2 and 3 , law cohort size was a poor predictor of the law degree earnings premium. We also consider another specification in which we scaled cohort size by the historical 25 Experience is often proxied by age. 26 Kahn, supra note 2; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz, supra note 2. 27 See Part III.B.
BLS projected job openings for lawyers, starting in the early 1970s. 28 We divide the size of the law cohort graduating that year by BLS projected job openings. This variable has a mean of 3; in other words, the number of law graduates has historically been 3 times the number of BLS projected job openings for lawyers. 29 Cohort size divided by BLS projected job openings is then normalized to be mean zero by subtracting 3 (its sample average). The results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficients are small and not statistically significant. The standard errors are sufficiently large that the size of any relationship is indeterminate for the two youngest groups. For older lawyers, the standard error of 0.2 rules out large effects of cohort size. In sum we find no evidence suggesting that cohort size relative to historical BLS projected lawyer job openings has any predictive power. 30 Although some legal scholars have used BLS projected job openings to predict outcomes for current law students, our results suggest that this is not a useful predictor.
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E. Quantile regression results
Rather than estimate only average earnings premiums, it is possible to estimate earnings premiums at different points in the distribution of earnings ability levels using quantile regression. Thus we could see if downturns have disproportionate effects on law graduates at the bottom, middle, or top of the distribution. Quantile regressions are also less sensitive than OLS to changes across SIPP versions in topcoding procedures. Quantile regressions also enable the relationship between each control variable and the earnings premium to vary at different points in the distribution. We use the same controls in our quantile regressions as in our Table 2 OLS regressions. while the middle and top both estimate a decline in the earnings premium of around 2.5% for every percent increase in unemployment at graduation. This effect is insignificant at the median, but marginally 28 BLS employment projections, available at http://www.bls.gov/emp/, should not be confused with the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/. The OES remains a useful and important, albeit imperfect, source of data. 29 If BLS projections were an unbiased prediction of the share of law graduates who would work as lawyers, we would expect around one third of law graduates to work as lawyers. However, historically around 60 percent of law graduates have worked as lawyers, which suggests that BLS projected job openings are biased down as an estimator of lawyer jobs. 30 To the extent that the BLS modifies its projection methods, we can't rule out the possibility that newer methods could eventually improve predictive accuracy, but the current baseline performance is very poor.
31 See supra note 8. We evaluate the historical methods used by the BLS. It is unclear at this point if the new job opening projections method proposed by the BLS will predict earnings premiums better than the old ones. In any case, that was never their intended purpose, and it would be safer to predict earnings premiums and value education based on historical earnings premiums.
significant at the 75 th percentile (p=0.06). Thus we have some evidence that the zero effect we found in the overall OLS sample may be averaging across a zero effect at the bottom with some small lifetime effects at the high end. As opposed to OLS, which did not detect a long-term effect for graduating into a recession on average, earners at the median may suffer a moderate lifetime loss, though one cannot reject the null hypothesis of no impact. However, as we discuss below, there can be substantial short-term effects.
In Column (2) (the more than 9 years of experience group), with respect to unemployment, the coefficients are close to zero. In Column (3) (5 to 8 years of experience), a 1 point increase in unemployment at graduation predicts a 4.7% decrease in the law earnings premium at the 50 th and 75 th percentile. This is only statistically significant at the 75 th percentile.
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In Column (4), for inexperienced workers, a 1 point drop in the unemployment rate would predict a 6% rise in the premium at the median and 75 th percentile, and about 3% at the bottom end. With respect to cohort size, we find no effects across experience levels. The coefficients are always very small and fluctuate between positive and negative depending on the percentile. This leads us to accept zero as the most likely true parameter value. If true, this suggests that a larger supply of law graduates in a given year will not necessarily lead to worse outcomes, because factors other than the supply of law graduates outweigh labor supply effects. These other effects could include changes in the demand for the labor of law graduates or changes in law school selectivity or educational quality.
Our estimates generally support what we found in the prior OLS results. Although the lowest ability and least experienced law graduates seem to show very high variability in outcomes, variability tamps down considerably as they gain experience. 33 We cannot reject the null that starting unemployment and cohort size effects are zero when averaged over all workers.
32 One potential concern is that topcoding might diminish the ability to detect earnings differences. If that were the case, we would expect unemployment effects to be relatively small at the 75 th percentile, where topcoding is more likely. However, unemployment effects are quite large at the 75 th percentile. 33 Remember that our "years of experience" is not counting years at a particular job or at any job, just years since graduation, and our sample includes those who report being unemployed.
F. Predicting cohort effects and "timing" law school
We found some evidence of an association between unemployment levels at graduation and subsequent earnings, especially for young workers at the high end of the earning distribution. This raises important questions about the extent to which prospective law students can predict cohort effects and adjust decisions about law school enrollment accordingly. In this section we test a naïve prediction strategy: assuming economic conditions at graduation will be similar to the most recently available data.
For data from the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), we use a 4-year lagged serial correlation, because the data is reported annually. We assume a 4-year lag because law school is typically 3 years long and because of delays between data collection and publication as well as the lead time required to apply and enroll in law school. In an unreported regression, we also test a 3-year lag using prime-age male unemployment (which is reported monthly and therefore entails less delay).
We use data from the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) on employment rates and log real full-time median starting salaries for recent law school graduates, 9 months after graduation, from 1985 to 2013. In Table 6 we attempt to predict initial job market employment and median log starting salaries based on lagged values for each of these variables or based on lagged values of both variables combined. Because we have so few years of data, this is more an illustrative exercise than a definitive one. But since the prospective student has no better information than us about macroeconomic trends, if we find nothing this suggests that a prospective student will also gain little predictive power from using these variables. We do have some computational advantages over this hypothetical student, though, which we will take advantage of. We allow for correlation in the unobserved component, the error term, to be serially correlated. 34 We also include specifications that control for a simple linear year trend.
Column (1) regresses employment rates for recent graduates on the employment rates four years prior.
The coefficient is negative (-0.346) and statistically insignificant (0.39) suggesting that low current employment actually predicts higher employment at graduation, although this conclusion is quite tenuous.
Column (2) regresses log earnings for recent graduates on log earnings four years prior. The results here are similar to those for employment, although in this case the coefficient is smaller (-0.046) while the standard error is similar (0.29). When we predict current values of employment based on past values of both employment and log earnings combined, we do find some modest evidence of predictability for employment in Columns (3) and (4). Column (4) reports the results with a control for a linear time trend.
The effect is small and countercyclical. Higher lagged earnings predicts lower employment in Column (4), although lagged employment itself has little predictive power. The earnings coefficient of -0.093 is 34 We assume the simple AR(1) process. We also looked at an OLS specification (available form the authors) with results that seemed less plausible. statistically significant and suggest that 10% lower earnings today predicts about one percentage point higher employment in four years.
In unreported results, we found that results are generally similar using 3-year lagged prime-age male unemployment (unemployment 3 years prior to law school graduation) interacted with the law premium.
The coefficients on 3-year lagged unemployment are small (around 3% or less) and positive across experience levels, but only approach borderline statistical significance for those with 9 or more years of experience. These results provide some support for a countercyclical strategy of matriculating to law school following declines in starting salaries of recent graduates or when unemployment is higher.
However, given the small effect sizes, it seems unlikely that potential benefits of such a strategy would compensate for opportunity costs of delaying law school attendance.
Although macroeconomic conditions at graduation affect law graduates' subsequent earnings, macroeconomic conditions at graduation may not be predictable at the time of enrollment. Data on recent outcomes for law graduates, such as data provided by NALP, may not provide more useful information than long-term historical averages. Further, Tables 2 through 5 show that cohort size and BLS projections also would not be useful predictors of cohort effects, even if perfect information about cohort size and BLS projections at graduation were available prior to enrollment. In an unreported regression, we also consider whether the inverted yield curve-a relatively strong predictor of economic downturns 35 -can forecast compression of law earnings premiums 4 years in advance and find that it is not a good predictor.
(The coefficient on the inexperienced sample suggests a -0.07 effect on the premium with a standard error of 0.09, so a substantial effect in the first four years is possible, but not likely). While it is possible that another prediction strategy could prove more effective, the economic literature generally suggests that forecasts of unemployment or other macroeconomic variables several years in the future are not particularly accurate. Given the challenges of prediction-driven timing of law school enrollment, cohort effects may simply be an unavoidable component of the variability and risk inherent in the decision to attend law school. cross sectional data on earnings of similar individuals of different ages or experience levels to predict the future real earnings of young workers based on the current real earnings of similar older workers. 36 We then estimate the impact of cohort effects across the lifecycle on the present value of the law degree premium over a lifetime. Another advantage of this approach is that aggregating effects across the lifecycle may make our lifetime estimates more precise than considering any one experience-level subgroup, while also acknowledging that future earnings are less valuable than current ones. We also simulate several law school timing strategies that involve delaying law school attendance and test how often such strategies pay off.
II. THE PRESENT VALUE OF
A. Present value of a law degree at the start of law school
In this section we estimate the lifetime present value of a law degree at the start of law school using data from the SIPP. This can be understood as the total economic value of a legal education. 37 This value will be apportioned between the law student through higher earnings, the federal government as recipient of income and payroll taxes, and law schools as recipients of tuition revenue.
We assume that law degree holders attend law school from age 23 to age 25. We estimate lifetime earnings streams from the age of 23 to 65 for all law degree holders and similar bachelor's, not just fulltime workers. We therefore incorporate differences in risk of unemployment or underemployment.
Using earnings estimates for bachelor's degree holders across ages as our baseline, we simulate 36 This assumption is conservative, assuming zero increase in real earnings over time due to secular economic growth (although individual worker's wages increase as they become more experienced) JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & ERIC C. NEWBURGER, THE BIG PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 8 (2002) ("these estimates do not account for any future productivity gains in the economy, and therefore, the estimates may be low."); ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE & BAN CHEAH, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS. 21 (2011) ("Productivity growth will [likely] lead to higher earnings in the future and therefore the career of today's young adults will lead to higher lifetime earnings than presented here.").
In reality, for the last three decades, workers with advanced degrees have seen their real wage earnings increase at much faster rate than less educated workers (i.e., education has become more valuable after controlling for work experience). See DAY AND NEWBURGER, supra at 3, fig. 2 (last visited Feb 6, 2015) . Recent estimates from long-term Census data suggest that real lawyer earnings for white males increased about 0.25 to 1 percent per year from secular growth since the 1960s. E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, CHOOSING TO BECOME A LAWYER tbl. 3 (2013) . Though more conservative than the secular growth trend suggested by long-term historical data, our zero-secular-growth assumption is consistent with a moderate version of the structural change hypothesis. More pessimistic secular growth assumptions can be modeled by adjusting the discount rate up. earnings of similar law degree holder at the same age by applying the appropriate coefficient from our OLS analysis in Table 2 and our quantile regression analysis in Table 5 . To estimate the impact of cohort effects on the lifetime law earnings premium, we adjust the post-law school earnings difference to reflect a two percentage point increase in unemployment or a five point increase in cohort size growth using the coefficients in Table 2 , Columns (2)-(4). A two-point rise in unemployment would simulate a modest recession comparable to the 1992 recession. A more severe recession like the 1982 or the 2008 recession could be simulated by roughly doubling the effect sizes. An economic boom could be simulated by reversing the signs, since our linear model assumes symmetrical effects.
38 A 5 percent increase in cohort size is bigger than most single year swings since the mid 1970s. To estimate cohort effects at different points in the distribution of lifetime earnings, we also use the parallel coefficients in Table 5 .
39
For each year, we subtract the earnings of the bachelor's degree holders from similar law degree holders. During the first 3 years while the law degree holders are in law school, the bachelor's have higher earnings than the law degree holders. 40 For the premiums, we compare a bachelor graduating in bad times to a law grad graduating in bad times.
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We discount the annual differences back to present value as of the start of law school using real discount rates of 3 percent (nominal discount rates of 6 percent) for our base case. This discount rate is typical in earnings premiums studies, reflects the actual cost of capital typically faced by law students, and may be conservative in light of student loan prepayments.
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Our estimates account for opportunity cost of lower earnings during law school compared to earnings of a bachelor's degree holder not attending school. 43 We assume that costs of living while in school are similar to costs of living while working full-time and that any differences reflect consumption benefits, and therefore need not be accounted for separate from opportunity costs of lower in-school earnings.
44 38 In an earlier version of this paper, we considered a dummy variable specification which suggested that graduating into a boom might have a larger effect on earnings than graduating into a recession, but large standard errors made this difficult to determine definitively. 39 Because we use all coefficients, and not just the statistically significant coefficients for the first four years, the lifetime value will sometimes be higher for those graduating in high unemployment than for those graduating in low unemployment or moderate unemployment. 40 See infra note 43. 41 An actual student would not choose between graduating with a law or bachelor's degree in the same year, but this comparison simplifies the analysis, and given the unpredictability of recessions and booms, probably does not make much of a difference. In Part B.
42 For an extended discussion of discount rates, see the appendix of our 2013 working paper. 43 We assume that law students earn $5,000 in their first year, $7,000 in their second year and $12,000 in their third year with part-time and summer work, for a total of $24,000 during law school. SIPP data suggests typical three-year in-school earnings between $21,800 (median) and $48,000 (mean) for full-time graduate and professional school students. Census data suggests substantial work hours among full-time graduate and professional students. JESSICA DAVIS, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND WORK STATUS: 2011 11-14 (2012 , http://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2012/acs/acsbr11-14.pdf (last visited Mar 3, 2015) . Assuming zero earnings while in law school would reduce lifetime values by around $24,000 and would not substantially alter our conclusions. 44 There are over 200 law schools around the country, so students have a variety of options in terms of location. Tables 2 and 5, then applies those coefficients to the re-estimated earnings profiles. Thus the bootstrap accounts for error in the estimated earnings profiles and the premium estimation as well as correlation in earnings for a given person over time. severe topcoding of incomes in our sample, the incorporation of older data when earnings for educated workers were substantially lower, and the unavailability of college major as a control variable.
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As previewed by table 2 and table 5 , changes in unemployment at graduation make little difference to lifetime earnings at the mean or 25 th percentile. The coefficients are close to zero and one cannot reject the possibility that there is no effect. However, the estimate is larger at the 50 th and 75 th percentile. The
Consumption is generally a function of income and is likely to be lower when income is lower while in school. 45 We perform 300 repetitions of the bootstrap simulation. 46 Simkovic and McIntyre, supra note 1 at 279-80. Simkovic & McIntyre (2014) used earnings data from 1996 to 2013 from a single consistent version of the SIPP, whereas we include data from earlier versions of the SIPP as far back as 1984. The data here feature both a lower base level of bachelor's degree holder earnings in dollars, and a lower percentage increase from the law earnings premium (compare table 2, infra to Id. at 257, tbl. 2). The difference in bachelor's degree holder earnings is worth about $200,000 in present value terms (before being multiplied by the earnings premium). This difference is likely due to a combination of rising real earnings for bachelor's degree holders and to changes in survey methods. In real terms, from 1980 to 2010, earnings of those with bachelor's degrees have grown around 14 percent for men and 70 percent for women. Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2015), tbls. 1,2 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2551567 (last visited Mar 3, 2015). Before 1996, monthly earnings in SIPP were topcoded at $8,333 per month (around $100,000 per year). Because topcoding was monthly, many individuals with less than $100,000 in annual earnings, but whose earnings were irregular, would be affected by topcoding. Post-1996 versions of the SIPP introduced improvements in topcoding procedures, replacing fixed topcode values with average values specific to groups defined by race, gender, and employment status. SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION USERS' GUIDE, Ch. 10, 32-36 (2001) , http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/methodology/users-guide.html.
These changes would increase reported earnings for relatively high earners in the post-1996 sample, including some bachelor's degree holders and many law degree holders. This would affect both the bachelor's degree holder base and the law earnings premium. In addition, the sample of bachelor's degree holders used for Simkovic & McIntyre's (2014) present value calculations were a group who were similar to law degree holders and therefore had somewhat higher earnings than average bachelor's degree holders.
With respect to the premium, in addition to aforementioned topcoding issues, removing unemployment interaction variables and averaging earnings over four years increases our average law earnings premium about 7 log points. Restricting our sample to 1996 and later further increases the premium to 3 log points. Adding controls for college major further increases the premium 6 log points. Adding additional controls for educational background used by Simkovic & McIntyre (2014) would reduce the premium slightly. Results are similar at the 75 th percentile, with a fairly large increase from restricting the sample to post-1996 and adding controls for college major. difference in lifetime earnings premiums is approximately $100,000 at the 50 th percentile (p=0.02) and $80,000 at the 75 th percentile (p=0.24). As before, the effects of cohort size are small and inseparable from zero. These results suggest that even at the 25 th percentile, and even among those graduating into a weak economy, the lifetime value of a law degree exceeds typical net-tuition costs by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Overall these results suggest modest effects of unemployment at graduation at the median (13 percent) with possibly substantial, though unverified, effects at the high end of the distribution (7 percent). This is consistent with Oyer et al.'s finding of cohort effects for graduates of elite MBA programs. 47 On the other hand, those toward the bottom of the distribution suffer almost no drop in law earnings premium from graduating during recessions, nor do they benefit from entering the labor market during booms.
Although the premium is lower toward the low end of the earnings distribution, the volatility in lifetime earnings because of conditions at graduation is minimal. Thus the relatively poor outcomes in the 25 th percentile do not appear to get much worse when the economy worsens.
B. Simulation of law school timing strategies
While economic conditions at graduation predict differences in lifetime earnings premiums for at least some law graduates, as noted in Part I.F. above, economic conditions at graduation are themselves difficult to predict prior to matriculating to law school. In addition, any potential gains from law school timing must be weighed against opportunity costs of lower earnings from additional years of labor force participation with a bachelor's degree instead of a law degree. This cost of delay will be tens of thousands of dollars per year.
In this section, we simulate the potential gains or losses from various law school timing strategies. As we discussed in Part I.A. above, one possibility is that in addition to macroeconomic variation and opportunity costs of delay, there may be lifecycle effects such that there are advantages to attending law school at an earlier or later age. However, we found no statistically significant effect for delay in law school attendance after controlling for delay in bachelor's completion. 48 The simulation initially starts with earnings at each age for a bachelor's degree as observed in our sample. We then simulate changes in the present value of earnings of law graduates and similar bachelor's from unemployment variation and changes in the number of years of earnings with a law degree. We assume that these two channelsunemployment and years of earnings with a law degree-are the only channels through which timing law 47 Oyer, supra note 2. 48 It is possible that a causal effect could push in one direction while selection could push in the other, resulting in no statistically significant effect. Whether there is a causal effect from completing graduate education earlier or later in life would be an interesting question for future research. school attendance affects the present value of the lifetime law earnings premium. In other words, consistent with our findings in Table 2 , we assume that there are no other inherent advantages or disadvantages to delaying or speeding up law school attendance, such as greater ease of learning at a younger age or with additional work experience. 49 We also fix cohort size, since our estimates above suggest that cohort size is not a good predictor of earnings premiums.
To account for the substantial uncertainty in unemployment, new unemployment series are generated by bootstrapping historical unemployment cycles from the late 1940s forward, sampling with replacement. This approach can generate more than 1 million possible unemployment series over the course of a lifetime. For more details, please see the data appendix.
We simulate 1000 possible outcomes using the following procedure for each repetition:
1. Draw parameter values for law school premium and the effect of unemployment at graduation and current unemployment on earnings for bachelors and law degree holders. Asserting the asymptotic results of the Central Limit Theorem hold, we draw new parameters from a multivariate normal distribution with means and variances from the model estimates in Tables 2 and 5. 2. Draw a new unemployment series sampling with replacement from historical business cycles, as described in the data appendix.
3. Generate law graduate earnings by applying the parameters from (1) to the bachelor's earnings series using the simulated unemployment data from (2) and determine the present value of lifetime earnings from attending law school immediately after college versus following a given timing strategy which will entail some delay.
Repeating the simulation many times, we then report the expected value of each timing strategy (relative to attending law school immediately), and the fraction of cases in which the timing strategy outperforms the "attend law school immediately" strategy. We consider strategies to use when graduating college into either a recession ("wait it out") or a boom ("countercyclical").
1. "Wait it out" strategies 49 Although attending law school earlier in life predicts higher earnings, this appears to be selection rather than causation (i.e., those with the highest earning potential are more likely to attend law school immediately or shortly after college). After controlling for the time to complete a bachelor's degree, the lower predicted earnings from a delay between completing college and attending law school is no longer statistically significant. This is consistent with the view that individuals with lower earning potential take longer to complete their schooling, whether at the collegiate or advanced degree level. Also consistent with this view, Simkovic & McIntyre (2014) found that within college major, longer time to college completion predicts lower earnings.
In this scenario, we assume that individuals graduate college into an economy where unemployment is more than 6.5 points (in other, words, more than 1.5 points above the historical average). For this simulation, average unemployment is 7.9 points at college graduation. We consider five possible law school timing strategies. Three of these strategies involve attending law school after unemployment declines. In the first version of this strategy, the individual will attend law school in the first year when unemployment drops relative to unemployment in the previous year. In the second version of this strategy, the individual will attend law school as soon as unemployment drops below 6.5 percent. In the third version of this strategy, the individual will attend law school when unemployment drops below 5.5 percent. The remaining two strategies involve attending law school after a predetermined wait period, which does not vary with subsequent changes in unemployment. In the first version of this strategy, the wait period is one year. In the second version of the strategy, the wait period is two years.
The results are reported in Table 8 . Row 1 shows the results for starting law school as soon as unemployment drops relative to the previous year. For average earners, this strategy pays off only 0.3 percent of the time compared to attending law school immediately. On average, this strategy loses the law graduate $75,000 in present value of earnings discounted back to college graduation. Although the strategy does successfully reduce the average unemployment rate at law school graduation to 4.67 points, the law premium is insensitive to unemployment at graduation, and on average law graduates using this strategy will lose 1.6 years of law premium. As we move to the right across columns and move up the distribution of earnings, the success rate increases slightly, but the costs of the strategy in present value of earnings also increase, from $44,000 at the 25 th percentile to $120,000 at the 75 th percentile.
All "wait it out" strategies perform poorly compared to attending law school immediately after college graduation. For average earners, those at the 25 th percentile, and those at the 75 th percentile, "wait it out" rarely pays off. The strategy pays off at most 5 percent of the time. For median earners, three out of the five versions of "wait it out" succeed less than 5 percent of the time, but two versions (attending law school when unemployment drops below 5.5 or 6.5 percent) succeed around 19 to 20 percent of the time.
The expected harm from "wait it out strategies" ranges from $30,000 to $150,000, with costs rising with delay and at higher points in the earnings distribution. Although most of these strategies can bring down unemployment at law school graduation, any benefits of this lower unemployment rate at labor market entry are swamped by the opportunity costs of delay.
"Countercyclical" strategies
In this scenario, we assume that individuals graduate college into a booming economy where unemployment is below 4 points (in other words, more than 1 point below the historical average). For this simulation, average unemployment at college graduation is 3.4 points. We consider five possible strategies. Three of these strategies involve attending law school after unemployment increases. In the first version of this strategy, the individual will attend law school in the first year when unemployment increases relative to unemployment in the previous year. In the second version of this strategy the individual will attend law school as soon as unemployment is above 4 percent. In the third version of this strategy, the individual will attend law school when unemployment increases to above 5 points (the historical average). As in the "wait it out" strategies described above, the remaining two strategies involve attending law school after a predetermined wait period, which does not vary with subsequent changes in unemployment. In the first version of this strategy, the wait period is one year. In the second version of the strategy, the wait period is two years.
The results are reported in Table 9 . Results are similar to Table 8 . Countercyclical strategies rarely succeed, and in expectation will impose substantial costs. Costs are highest for waiting until unemployment increases above 5 points, which typically takes 4 years. At the median this costs around $224,000 and costs even more at the 75 th percentile. As was the case for "wait it out" strategies, costs increase with delay in law school attendance and at higher points in the earnings distribution.
All of the law school timing strategies are worse than attending law school immediately, but the least harmful strategy is to wait 1 year before attending law school if graduating college into a boom. At the median and 75 th percentile this strategy can succeed over one third of the time, and in expectation only costs $27,000 to $41,000.
Figure 3 summarizes these results, plotting expected costs against delay for earners at different points in the distribution. Across strategies, the cost of each year of delay of law school averages $31,000.
In sum, an immediate attendance strategy outperforms all of the waiting strategies we tested, and usually by a very wide margin. These simulations suggest that waiting to attend law school in an attempt to "time" the market is likely to be a financially costly strategy for most of those who try it, since the lost earnings are fairly certain, while potential gains are small and nebulous.
III. ROBUSTNESS
A. OLS compared to Instrumental Variables estimates
A standard criticism of an OLS education coefficient is that ability bias moves the coefficient up.
Several studies have attempted to estimate the causal effect of education on earnings using instrumental variables (IV) approaches in addition to OLS. These studies suggest that IV estimates using the same sample and control variables as OLS often produces substantially higher estimates of earnings premiums than OLS. 50 Although our data cannot readily be analyzed using instrumental variables or twins data, the existing literature suggests that such an approach would be more likely to increase our earnings premium estimates than to decrease them. 51 Further, it would take a tremendous amount of data specific to lawyers, given the typical power of instrumental variables approaches.
OLS estimates may not be as upwardly biased as is often suspected. Measurement error tends to push the estimates down, canceling out some or possibly all upward ability bias. Setting aside errors in reported education, several studies comparing SIPP earnings data to matched Social Security Administration earnings records concluded that highly educated high-earners tend to underreport their earnings to SIPP, while less educated, lower earning workers tend to overreport earnings. 52 Thus, given the current state of the literature, we feel the OLS results are a worthwhile starting point.
B. Alternative OLS specifications
We considered several alternative OLS specifications in unreported regressions available from the authors. One concern is that cohort size and unemployment controls may be two representations of the same phenomenon and so allowing for both creates a noisy signal for each one. We addressed this by estimating two regressions that consider effects on the law premium of either cohort size or initial unemployment, but not both simultaneously. Results were quite similar to the baseline specification, which simultaneously controls for both initial unemployment and cohort size. In particular, cohort size remained a statistically insignificant predictor of outcomes.
Another concern is that we may simply be recovering long-term trend in law premiums. For example, if the law premium was rising over time then it would look high recently, even though the unemployment rate spiked up. We controlled for this by including in ! ! a linear trend variable to affect earnings premiums. We find no evidence of a significant linear trend in law degree premiums or that controlling for such a trend affects the reported results. The coefficient was both small and insignificant.
In earlier versions of the paper, we focused on a more flexible dummy variable specification to capture nonlinear unemployment or cohort size effects. unemployment categories: high (greater than 6 percent), medium (4 to 6 percent), and low unemployment (less than 4 percent). The cutoffs for high and low unemployment divide the sample so that approximately 25 percent graduated into high unemployment, 25 percent graduated into low unemployment, and 50 percent graduated into intermediate unemployment. We created a parallel set of three cohort size growth dummies. While the unreported results (available from the authors) were consistent with what we found here, they did suggest that the unemployment effects for the inexperienced law graduates were concentrated on boom times with little effects during recessions. The results, though, are ultimately unsatisfying due to the painful increase in standard errors. Few outcomes could be separated either from each other or from zero and in many cases one could rule out neither zero nor moderately large results of either sign.
Our preferred estimates use national unemployment levels at the time of graduation. To the extent that law is a national market, or that national unemployment reflects macroeconomic drivers of law graduate outcomes, this is the right measure to use.
53 Alternately, we can use state level unemployment rates at the time of graduation. This has the advantage of introducing additional variability in unemployment rates. However there are several disadvantages to this approach, such as endogeneity of the choice of location and imperfect measurement of law school location, 54 as well as unobserved differences across states confounding the results. Nevertheless, we considered this alternate estimator as an additional robustness check. Thus we included unemployment in the state of current residence at the time of graduation and interact it with the law premium instead of using the national unemployment rate.
Additionally we controlled for state fixed effects, although we did not interact these with the law premium, given the large number of states. The cohort effects estimates are, if anything, smaller and less statistically significant in this unreported specification.
Our base specification measures cohort size based on year over year change to avoid problems with trends or scaling. Using alternate measures of cohort size based on fraction of bachelor's degree graduates or population suggests a relationship between cohort size and earning that may be positive, but the estimates are too imprecise to draw any inferences.
53 Although legal practice is licensed at the state level, graduates of any law school approved by the American Bar Association are eligible to sit for the bar examination in all 50 states. In many states, experienced attorneys from other states who graduated from ABA approved law schools can be admitted on motion, without the need for an additional examination. ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2013 8-11, 34-38 (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds., 2013 . In addition, because around 40 percent of law graduates are not employed as lawyers, many law graduates do not require state-specific licenses. Simkovic and McIntyre, supra note 1 at 252. 54 SIPP tracks respondents' current location at the time of the survey and their birth location, but not the location of the law school from which they graduated. For many inexperienced law graduates, current state location will be the same as law school state location. Therefore the unemployment variable for the state analysis is unemployment in current state of residence at the time of law school graduation.
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C. Post-2008 structural shifts and the recent earnings premium
Employment outcomes for recent law school graduates have deteriorated. According to the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), real full-time starting salaries for recent law school graduates declined by 20 percent between 2009 and 2012. The percent of graduates employed 9 months after graduation also declined 4 percent. NALP starting salary and employment data suggest that recent law graduates are facing market conditions similar to young law graduates in the early to mid-1990s. Based on initial outcomes for recent graduates and qualitative factors, Henderson and Zahorsky argue that the legal profession is experiencing a "structural shift" due to globalization and technological change.
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Others point to a decline in the size of "legal services" (law firms) relative to GDP. 56 What this means for law school graduates is uncertain, since most legal services workers are not lawyers, 57 and many law graduates work in fields other than legal services. relative to default rates for graduates of other programs remained constant (default rates increased proportionately for both groups), and law firm profitability increased. They also note that the labor economics literature suggests that automation and outsourcing tend to increase the earnings of more educated workers relative to less educated workers.
To better understand the impact of the recent downturn on inexperienced law graduates, we consider supplemental data from ACS. ACS has variables for occupation, which enables us to identify a subset of young law graduates-those working as lawyers. This is not definitive because we consider only the limited subset of law graduates who work as lawyers. We construct a more inclusive group of professional degree holders by including all professional degree holders other than those employed in medical fields. This will exclude most graduates of medical and nursing programs, leaving a group that includes all law graduates (including the substantial minority not working as lawyers) as well as some non-law graduate professional degree holders such as graduates of education and divinity programs. Figure 5 compares the earnings premiums of this group of young non-medical professional degree holders relative to bachelor's degree holders before and after 2008. As in Figure 4 , the bottom line shows earnings premiums for non-medical professional degree holders ages 27 to 30, while the top line shows earnings premiums for those ages 31 to 34. As in Figure 4 , the results suggest that earnings premiums were not substantially lower for recent law graduates than the average for the pre-2008 period, and that declines in earnings among young law graduates were likely matched by declines in earnings among young bachelor's degree holders.
These results are consistent with the previous analysis of SIPP data, although the effects of unemployment and recession are probably a little smaller. In SIPP data, we found evidence for possible effects of marginal statistical significance. Here we see possible evidence for, at most, small drops in the premium during recessions as well as possibly some rises during booms.
Our results In Figures 3 and 4 might be affected by a change in composition if, for example, law jobs became scarce. Figure 6 examines the composition of the non-medical professional degree holders over time. Figure 6 shows that the share of non-medical professional degree holders working as lawyers is about the same before and after 2008, and in most years is slightly more than half. Figure 6 shows the absolute number of young lawyers before and after 2008. The number of young lawyers does not appear to have declined substantially. This suggests that the results in Figures 3 and 4 are unlikely to be driven by changes in composition of our law graduate proxy groups.
As noted in Part I.F. , NALP data on starting salaries and employment for recent graduates is a poor predictor of outcomes for prospective students who will graduate four years in the future. Starting salaries are also not a particularly good predictor of long-term earnings. However, we do find evidence of cohort effects related to unemployment rates at graduation, at least for the first four years after graduation.
This suggests that recent graduates who entered the labor market in the post-2008 recession are likely to initially get less benefit from their law degrees than those who entered during the boom years of the late 1990s or mid-2000s (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
CONCLUSION
We investigate whether economic conditions at labor market entry have persistent effects on law graduates' earnings relative to similar bachelor's degree holders. We find that unemployment levels at graduation continue to affect law earnings premiums within 4 years after graduation. Among inexperienced workers, a one percent increase in unemployment at graduation predicts a drop in the annual law earnings premium of approximately 5 percent. The effect appears to be larger at the middle and upper end of the earnings distribution, and minimal toward the low end of the earnings distribution and on average. However, the effect quickly fades as law graduates gain experience. The impact on lifetime earnings premiums of graduating with 2 percent higher unemployment (a moderate recession) is essentially zero toward the low end of the earnings distribution. For the middle and upper end of the distribution, there is some evidence of a moderate impact on the lifetime premium, around a 7 to 13 percent loss.
Whereas unemployment at graduation predicts earnings premiums in the short run, graduating with an unusually large or small cohort of law students does not predict earnings premiums. This may be because multiple factors change at the same time as cohort size, such as law school selectivity, resources per 60 Around 60 percent of law school graduates practice law. Id. at 252.
student and education quality, or demand side factors, and these may offset changes in the supply of law graduates. BLS projected job openings are also not an effective predictor of earnings premiums.
Projections for a specific occupation may be poor predictors of education earnings premiums, and BLS projections themselves may be poor predictors of labor market conditions. Unemployment and starting salaries at graduation are not readily predictable prior to matriculation.
Because the likelihood of correctly predicting unemployment at graduation several years in advance is close to random chance, and because the potential payoff to correctly predicting favorable graduation conditions is relatively low compared to lifetime earnings at the mean, attempting to "time" law school attendance to exploit cohort effects does not appear to be a viable strategy.
Simulating a variety of law school timing strategies, we found that the opportunity cost of a delay in law school completion-that is, lower earnings early in one's career working with a bachelor's degree rather than a law degree-quickly outweigh any potential gains. For college graduates intent on law school, the best strategy to maximize the value of the law degree is to attend early and thereby maximize the number of years of post-law-school earnings.
The variability of early earnings due to macroeconomic conditions that are unpredictable and uncontrollable (at least for law graduates and law schools) suggests a role for risk spreading across cohorts and across experience levels. For example, student loan default risks can be mitigated through flexible debt repayment schedules that delay loan repayment until graduates gain experience and their earnings become higher and more stable. Historical data suggests that many recession-era graduates who suffer from low early earnings will, over the course of their careers, be able to repay their loans in full while still benefiting financially from attending law school.
There are important limitations to our study. Although we cannot rule out selection or omitted variable bias, because unemployment at graduation is not predictable at the time of selection into law school, the limited effects we have found are unlikely to be due to unobserved changes in ability differences, but rather are likely genuinely due to macroeconomic factors. Another limitation is that we are measuring systemic differences in earnings. Individual outcomes vary, and we only account for a limited proportion of the total variance in earnings.
Perhaps the most substantial limitation is that recessions and booms are infrequent events, so that we only have a limited number of them for evaluating the outcomes of newly minted J.D.s. While these results represent the best available evidence, future expansions or recessions may well be different.
Commenters should exercise considerable restraint in making strong claims about future outcomes based on current conditions. Nevertheless, our results suggest that attempting to time law school is unlikely to improve the value of the law degree. Commonly used bellwethers-such as current economic conditions, outcomes for recent graduates or changes in law school enrollment or BLS job opening projections-are poor predictors of outcomes for those currently matriculating to law school. Moreover, the consequences of graduating into a recession are unlikely to be severe enough to make law school a poor investment relative to a terminal bachelor's degree. Even for relatively low earners, and even for those who are unlucky enough to graduate into a weak economy, a law degree has typically more than paid for itself over the course of a lifetime. Indeed, earnings premiums for low earners appear to be insensitive to macroeconomic conditions at graduation.
The effects of graduating into a recession or a boom are unlikely to change law school from a good investment to a poor one, but may help predict how good of an investment it will ultimately be for law graduates toward the upper end of the earnings distribution.
APPENDIX: DATA SIPP is consistent from 1996 through 2013, but there were several methodological changes between 1984 and 1996. Important changes starting in the 1996 version of SIPP include: roughly doubling the sample size; lengthening panels from 3 to 4 years and eliminating overlapping panels; introducing computer assisted interviewing to improve data collection and reduce errors; introducing oversampling of low income neighborhoods to mitigate response bias; 61 new income topcoding procedures; 62 and different imputation methods. In addition, many questions appear in different modules or have responses coded in slightly different ways. 63 We merged different versions of SIPP into a single harmonized data set using crosswalks, adjustments to imputation methods; and manual recoding.
Some control variables, such as advanced high school work in math, science or English, are not available in early versions of the SIPP, but the most important control variables (demographics, college major, graduation and birth year) are available across versions. College major is not available for those 61 A different oversampling procedure was used in the 1990 SIPP panel, which targeted households from the 1989 panel in which the head of household was black, Hispanic, or a female single parent.
62 Notably for our purposes, starting in 1996 the values for monthly earnings entered in months that are topcoded depends on the average earnings of all topcoded earnings for respondents with the same race, gender, and work status. Prior to 1996, the topcoded earnings did not depend on earnings of similar individuals, and were instead listed as $33,332 per quarter or $8,333 per month for all topcoded values. Pre-1996 panels may therefore dramatically understate mean earnings, and may only be useful for quantile regressions below the topcode level.
63 For example, a variation on the "Education and Training History" topical module was asked as "Education and Work History" and "Education and Training" during waves in 1984. Some aspects of "Employment History" were moved into core content in 1996, whereas, such questions had previously been part of a topical module. Several questions about family background, such as parental education, are only available in 1986 to 1988.
Responses to questions abut geography use slightly different state groupings in 1984 to 1993 compared to 1996 and beyond. In 1984 to 1993, 41 states and the District of Columbia were reported individually, plus three groups of the remaining 9 states. In 1996 and beyond, 45 states plus the District of Columbia were individually reported, plus two groups of the remaining 5 states.
with advanced degrees in the 1980s, so analysis based on college major are restricted to earnings data from the 1990s. The education variables are not always available for the full SIPP sample in earlier years; they are sometimes only available for one or a few waves where the supplemental education questionnaire was administered. Therefore, the amount of data from some earlier years is limited. In two years-1985 and 1989-key education variables are simply not available for any members of the sample, and we therefore have no law degree holder earnings data for these years. However, we will still have earnings data in other years for individuals who graduated law school during those years, and this should enable us to check for cohort effects from the late 1980s / early 1990s economic downturn as well as earlier and later recessions.
Our sample contains earnings data from 1984 to 2013 for individuals age 23 to 65 with either a bachelor's or law degree.
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While we include in our sample those who report being disabled or unemployed but looking for work, we exclude people who were enrolled in school full-time during the panel. We also exclude the small number of people who graduated and entered the labor force in the 1930s through 1950s because data on cohort size and unemployment is not consistently available. We exclude people whose education level is less than a bachelor's degree and people with advanced degrees in a field other than law.
We construct a sample of bachelor's degree holders and law degree holders using the SIPP's topical module on education. Because the module is administered early in the panel, we only know if someone has completed a bachelor's degree or a law degree at the beginning of the survey. Those who start the survey in graduate school are dropped from the sample because the data is insufficient to determine if they are pursuing a law degree.
SIPP provides excellent coverage of a range of ages and a number of years, but is somewhat limited in measurements of ability. Prior work using detailed data from the National Education Longitudinal Study, found little evidence that ability sorting biases the SIPP estimates. 65 Even if there is substantial bias, if it is either constant over time or changes fairly slowly it should mostly bias the average law premium and have little impact on the interactions we are trying to recover.
The Time to BA variable is centered on 0 (4 years to complete a bachelor's degree is set to a value of zero), and we limit its range to be from -1 to 4 (those who take less than 3 years or more than 8 years to complete a bachelor's degree are treated as identical to those completing in 3 years or 8 years). About 64 We use age 23 to 25 earnings of bachelor's degree holders who resemble law degree holders to estimate opportunity costs of foregone earnings while in law school for purposes of calculating the present value of the law degree. Our regressions of annual and log earnings, wages, and work hours include only people age 25 to 65. We required law degree holders to report earning a professional school degree in the field of law and excluded a small number of individuals reporting a master's or doctorate degree. We also dropped all those imputed to be lawyers. 65 Simkovic and McIntyre, supra note 1.
three quarters of the sample falls in the 3 to 8 year range. Because our Time to BA variable assumes that individuals start college at age 18, and does not take into account differences in month of birth or reporting, it could be a year off.
The BA to Law variable is calculated based on the year of law school completion, the year of bachelor's completion, and an assumption that law school takes 3 years to complete (although it would take 4 years for the minority of students in part-time programs). BA to Law ranges from 0 (i.e., starting law school immediately after college) to 7 (starting law school 7 years after completing college).
Approximately 85 percent of law graduates in-sample start law school within 7 years of graduating college. We topcode BA to Law at 7 years. For those with terminal bachelor's, this variable is arbitrarily set to zero. The value of BA to Law is irrelevant for those without a law degree because it is only included in the regression as an interaction term with a law degree, and for those with terminal bachelor's, will be multiplied by zero.
With respect to the simulation of law school timing strategies, we require 43 years of unemployment data. To do this we generate new unemployment series starting with historical unemployment from the late 1940s forward. Historical unemployment is divided into economic cycles, starting from the lowest unemployment and going until unemployment again bottoms out. Thus each cycle includes an economic boom, a bust, and a recovery. There are a total of 10 cycles. We overdraw with replacement until we have 200 years, and then drop the first 60 observations so that we start from an arbitrary point rather than at the beginning of a cycle. We then trim additional observations until the first observation meets the start criteria for the simulation; for example, unemployment to be at least 1.5 points above the historical average in the first year (the year of graduation from college). Note that some historical unemployment cycles never reach these thresholds and so will not normally be the starting cycle.
Whenever we draw a cycle, we also draw a uniform random variable between plus or minus 0.5 and add it to the cycle, which increases variation in the cycles. Adding a perturbation of 0.5 increases the available set of starting years. Because we have so few cycles to draw from, we also restrict each draw to not be the same as the last draw. Asymptotically this should make no difference, but in our small sample we suspect it may slightly improve performance. This leaves 9 possible cycles to choose from each step.
Because each cycle is approximately 6 years in length, over a 43-year period, this allows for approximately 7 cycles incorporated into each series. Back of the envelope calculations suggests that this can generate more than 1 million possible unemployment series, aside from the perturbations.
There are possible biases in this approach relative to historical unemployment. For "wait it out", because our series must start in a recession, the economy we simulate will on average be slightly worse than the historical economy, all else being equal. Similarly, for "countercyclical" strategies, because our Each row reports on full regressions using the dependent variable in the left column. Sample includes those age 25-65 with either a law or bachelor's degree. Columns 2 through 4 use subsamples defined by years of experience (years since graduating law school or college).
Observations are people-years. Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. As discussed in the text, many of the same control variables used in Table 2 are included here, but are not shown (race, sex, ethnicity, and education background variables). Each row reports on full regressions using the dependent variable in the left column. Sample includes those age 25-65 with either a law or bachelor's degree. Columns 2 through 4 use subsamples defined by years of experience (years since graduating law school or college).
Observations are people-years. Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. Control variables are as in Table 3 , but are not shown (race, sex, ethnicity, and education background variables). Each row reports on full regressions using the dependent variable in the left column. Sample includes those age 25-65 with either a law or bachelor's degree. Columns 1 through 3 use subsamples defined by years of experience (years since graduating law school or college). Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlations within a given person's earnings stream. Controls are the same as in Table 2 , but are not reported. All work statuses, 3 percent real discount rate (6 percent nominal). Sample includes degree holders who are currently employed, unemployed, or disabled, but excludes those who are currently who are currently full-time students. Reported values include the opportunity cost of attending law school in terms of foregone earnings, but do not include tuition or federal taxes. Real 2013 dollars. Coefficients from Table 2 and Table 5 used to adjust earnings premiums in all years. For each strategy, we report the average success rate and expected value relative to immediate matriculation. The success rate is the percent of times when the timing strategy performs better than attending law school immediately. We also report average delay when using this strategy in years and the average unemployment rate at law school graduation when using the strategy. At college graduation, unemployment is always more than 6.5 points. For this simulation, the average unemployment rate at college graduation is 7.9 points. Unemployment at college graduation does not vary between "wait it out" strategies. For each strategy, we report the average success rate and expected value relative to immediate matriculation. The success rate is the percent of times when the timing strategy performs better than attending law school immediately. We also report average delay when using this strategy in years and the average unemployment rate at law school graduation when using the strategy. At college graduation, unemployment is always below 4 points. For this simulation, the average unemployment rate at college graduation is 3.4 points. Unemployment at college graduation does not vary between "countercyclical" strategies.
